Two Federal Courts Found Google Liable for Monopolizing Digital Advertising

The two U.S. federal rulings discussed below are the most detailed judicial examinations of Google's advertising practices ever produced. But they emerged against the backdrop of a broader pattern: antitrust regulators across multiple continents have independently investigated Google's conduct in digital advertising and reached similar conclusions.

Two separate federal trials produced detailed findings about how Google inflated advertising costs. The first addressed search advertising directly. The second addressed the ad tech infrastructure through which display and programmatic ads are bought and sold.

Google paid Apple approximately $20 billion per year to remain the default search engine on iPhones and Safari. That figure alone is remarkable, but the contract terms are what matter legally. The agreement included a "substantially similar" clause that effectively prohibited Apple from building, acquiring, or promoting its own competing search product. Apple, a $3 trillion company with the engineering capability to build anything, was contractually prevented from competing.

Samsung, Mozilla, and major Android device manufacturers had parallel arrangements. The court found that 80% of all search distribution channels in the United States were locked up under these contracts. The remaining 20% was fragmented across carriers, enterprise IT, and niche browsers, none of which could sustain a viable search competitor at scale.

With competitors shut out of distribution, Google faced no meaningful check on advertising prices. The court documented three specific mechanisms, internally referred to as "pricing knobs," that Google used to systematically raise advertiser costs without improving ad quality or relevance. Each was documented through internal Google communications and trial testimony.

Raising prices is one half of the strategy. The other half is making sure advertisers cannot see clearly enough to object. The court documented a parallel campaign to restrict advertiser transparency and lock in spending.

In 2008, Google acquired DoubleClick for $3.1 billion, gaining control of the dominant publisher ad server (DFP, roughly 60% market share). This was the cornerstone purchase. The publisher ad server decides which ad fills every slot on a website, and critically for advertisers, it controls which exchanges get to compete for each impression and how those auctions run. Fewer competing exchanges means less price discipline and higher costs for buyers. Within two years, Google had locked DFP to its own exchange, AdX, making AdX the only exchange that could compete for DFP inventory in real time.

Google then acquired AdMeld in 2011 for $400 million. AdMeld had been routing publisher inventory to whichever exchange offered the best price, which meant more exchanges competing for the same impressions. More competition among exchanges means lower transaction costs for advertisers. Google's own internal analysis flagged AdMeld as a threat precisely because it was introducing price competition into a market Google wanted to control. Google bought the threat and shut it down, removing a mechanism that had been pushing costs down for buyers.

The E.D. Virginia decision documents a pattern that is unusual even by antitrust standards. Google actively deployed a succession of mechanisms, each designed to neutralize a specific competitive threat as it emerged. The court found all of the following to be anticompetitive:

The counter-measures continued

Most antitrust cases against major technology companies never reach trial. Of those that do, liability findings under Section 2 of the Sherman Act are rare enough that the Microsoft case in 2001 stood alone for over two decades. Google now holds that distinction twice, from two separate courts, on two separate bodies of evidence. Both findings came after full adversarial proceedings with extensive witness testimony, documentary evidence, and cross-examination. Judicial findings of this kind carry substantial weight in every proceeding that follows.

The two cases address different parts of the same business, and the interplay is important for understanding the full scope of advertiser harm.

The D.C. case (Judge Mehta) covers search advertising: the text ads that appear when you type a query into Google. Because Google locked up 80% of search distribution through exclusive contracts, advertisers had no alternative for reaching 90% of search users. Google exploited that captive audience through three pricing knobs, query report restrictions, and match type manipulation. If you ran search campaigns through Google Ads, this case covers your spending.

The Virginia case (Judge Brinkema) covers the ad tech stack: the infrastructure of ad servers, exchanges, and buying tools through which display, video, and programmatic ads are bought and sold. Google monopolized all three layers and used that control to extract a 30-35% toll on every transaction while sabotaging every competitive alternative. If you bought programmatic display or video through DV360, Google Ads Display Network, or any exchange that routed through AdX, this case covers your spending.

The court rulings address structural remedies: divestitures, interoperability requirements, behavioral restrictions. Financial recovery for individual advertisers requires separate proceedings. In 2017, Google amended its advertising terms of service to include a mandatory arbitration clause with a class action waiver. Federal courts have upheld it every time it has been challenged, most recently in January 2025. Unless you opted out within thirty days, your path to financial recovery runs through individual arbitration with the American Arbitration Association.

Attorneys and firms pursuing these claims have focused on three factors: the Google Advertiser IDs associated with your accounts, the amount spent, and the time period of that spending.

Claims filed to date have been on behalf of companies that spent money directly with Google through Google Ads accounts on search and display advertising from August 2016 to the present. Each account is identified by a GAID. YouTube and Google Shopping expenditures have not been part of the claims filed so far.

Agency relationships. Where a company paid Google directly and the accounts are in its name, that company has been the claimant. Where a company paid an agency that in turn paid Google through agency-owned accounts, practitioners have generally looked to the agency as the party with the direct relationship. The key question is who was the account holder of record.

Arbitration status. Attorneys evaluating claims have reviewed when clients accepted Google Ads terms containing the arbitration provision, and whether they exercised opt-out rights within the applicable window. Google maintains records of account term acceptance. Counsel familiar with these cases can assess your status if it is unclear.

Corporate changes. Practitioners evaluating portfolio claims have noted that equity sales generally preserve the legal entity and its claims, while asset sales typically leave claims with the seller unless explicitly addressed in the transaction. Former owners of defunct businesses, and companies that have acquired others with significant Google ad spend, may also qualify. If your situation involves either, speaking with an attorney experienced in Google Ads arbitration is the right first step.